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Immigration and multiculturalism in Britain:  
New issues in research and policy1 
Werner F. Menski 
 
I 
Shifting boundaries and fresh agenda 
 
The broad title of ‘Immigration and multiculturalism in Britain’ looks like an ‘old hat’, but is 
a complex theme of research that has been experiencing enormously important recent 
changes, which many researchers in different academic disciplines are struggling to 
understand.2 The main purpose of this paper, from my interdisciplinary perspective as a 
South Asia area expert and an immigration specialist, is to convey some insights into these 
recent changes in the British scenario and perceptions of immigration and ‘multiculturalism’. 
These are fields of study that used to be originally subsumed under ‘race relations’, a title that 
highlights the earlier focus on ‘race’ as a marker of difference. Such approaches are now 
outdated and have clearly been overtaken by recent events and developments. It has now 
become more widely recognised that immigration to Britain is not all about economics, nor is 
the wider discourse just about ‘race’, it is much more about culture and ethnic and personal 
identity (Malik 1996), personal choice and, thus, at the end, about human rights. 
The migration of various non-white groups of people to the UK since the 1950s, in 
particular, has brought with it a number of important consequences that are only now 
becoming more evident, roughly a generation or two later. In the field of immigration, we 
have witnessed the emergence of immigration law as a separate field or branch of study and 
practice, with specific practitioners’ textbooks (Macdonald and Blake 1995) and reading 
material (Sachdeva 1993), and its own professional journal.3 Immigration law has shown a 
clearly emerging identity as a major legal subject area in its own right, marked by immense 
complexity and overlap with fields like European law and human rights law. Within it, the 
field of asylum law has been taking more prominence during the late 1990s, compared to the 
earlier focus on worker and family migration. 
                                                 
1 This paper is a slightly revised and enlarged version of a lecture delivered at Osaka University of Foreign 
Studies on 25th July 2002, during my tenure as a Visiting Professor at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. I 
am grateful to Professors Tsuneo Hamaguchi and Masaki Takayama for inviting me to Osaka, and thank the 
participants in the discussion for their critical, constructive comments. 
2 For a recent example, see the debate in Vol. 18 No. 4 [August 2002] of Anthropology Today, pp. 20-21. 
3 The journal used to be called Immigration and Nationality Law and Practice (INLP, Vols. 1-14 [1986-2000] 
and was renamed Immigration Asylum and Nationality Law (IANL, from Vol. 15 [2001] onwards) to reflect the 
growing prominence of asylum law. 
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My key argument regarding shifts and changes in Britain in relation to multiculturalism is 
that the migration processes involving mainly non-white people bring cultural implications, 
especially when we are dealing with assimilation and education. Earlier, in the colonial 
period, European colonisers went all over the world and took their ‘cultural baggage’ with 
them. Today’s migrants do the same, but are often denied the right to practise their cultures, 
and they remain physically distinct and are treated as ‘ethnic’ others, even though we should 
be aware that everybody is ‘ethnic’. 
It is obvious that no amount of assimilation and education will make ‘brown’ people 
‘white’. It is now being recognised that ‘race’ per se is a somewhat fluid constant, a 
constructed element. At the same time, it continues to have tangible consequences in today’s 
multi-ethnic societies and remains a relevant element in the wider debates about immigration 
and multiculturalism. Recent events in Europe show, however, that ‘race’ alone is not the 
most significant element, since there has also been much resistance against migration of 
white people to the UK, such as Poles and various types of ex-Yugoslavians. 
It is evident today, from the USA and Canada as much as from Britain, that the issues 
concerning immigration and multiculturalism have metamorphosed before our very eyes. 
Scholars now increasingly recognize, albeit still with much reluctance, that immigrants resist 
outright assimilation and will therefore reconstruct their own little worlds in diaspora in new 
ways that we, as social scientists, have yet to learn to understand much better. The work of 
Roger Ballard (1994) on how Asians in Britain reconstruct their lives to create a new home 
abroad demonstrates that there is no straight line from tradition to modernity, from East to 
West, or South to North. Ballard’s observations demonstrate that classic assimilation models 
are no longer useful. His analysis suggests that we need new research agenda today that will 
enable us to better understand the lives of immigrants and their descendants in all kinds of 
societies – and to gauge our own reactions to them. 
In this regard, one major emerging practical problem has been, for a long time, that 
immigrants and ethnic minorities in Britain and other places are now forcing their new 
countries to learn about their ‘ethnic’ cultures and traditions, rather than the reverse, as was 
originally expected.4 In the USA, the image of the ‘melting-pot’ is still relevant, but has 
quietly been replaced by the ‘salad bowl’ model, in which cultural and ethnic identities do not 
just disappear through a process of blending the elements of the multicultural salad. The 
cucumber is still a cucumber, and the tomato still a tomato, but they have taken on a different 
flavour, too. In Canada, the ‘mosaic’ model has been applied to create an image of Canadian 
                                                 
4 Putting the issue this way highlights the fact that everybody is ‘ethnic’, and that therefore, in Britain for 
example, English ways of life also have ‘ethnic’ characteristics. One would expect that a national British paper 
such as The Times would be able to handle such subtleties, but the title of Owen (2002) confirms that this is not 
the case. 
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society as composed of all kinds of immigrants and their descendants. Australia has begun to 
recognise this pluralising fact, too, and various European countries are experimenting with 
different models of respect for ethnic minority groups and their socio-cultural needs. 
Literature is now beginning to emerge from various European countries (for Germany see 
Rohe 2001) and Canada (Verma 2002). 
For Britain, too, this means that mainstream Britain has to know more about South Asians, 
Africans and many others. We can no longer rely on the writing of the early experts on race 
relations like John Rex (1986; 1988) and Michael Banton (1967; 1977; 1988), whose largely 
class-based analyses and race-focused approaches systematically underestimated the role of 
socio-cultural factors, assuming that over time there would be more or less complete 
assimilation of the ‘immigrants’ into the mainstream society. In such frameworks of reference, 
the anticipated construction of anything multicultural, if at all, was mainly a question of 
generational change and assimilation through education. 
But the underlying perception of an unchanging mainstream society is now proving to be 
quite inadequate. Britain itself has been visibly changing as a result of migration streams 
from all over the world. I am not only thinking about the curry houses on every corner, or 
statistics that tell us that around 75% of all retail business in Britain today is controlled by 
Asians. Entering some schools in multicultural Britain today, especially in central London, 
the Midlands, Yorkshire or Scotland, you would think you are in India or Pakistan. Not just 
the British education system, but the entire range of governmental and non-governmental 
agencies in Britain has to understand something about the rules of Islam, Hinduism and Sikh 
beliefs and practices, but has not been adequately prepared for such expectations. We can no 
longer just insist on compliance with British, let alone English standards, as was expected and 
virtually demanded until the mid-1980s (Poulter 1986). 
For all those who are specialists on Britain and British culture, the clear message is that the 
UK is no longer Queen Victoria’s splendid world empire, but a multicultural new nation in 
which the teachers are still mainly white, but many of the pupils are now brown or black, 
come from all kinds of cultural backgrounds, and have as mother tongue speakers an amazing 
fluency in many languages that other people are struggling to study. Somali is now the 
majority home language for children in many London schools, and young Somalis, Eritreans 
and Ethiopians are beginning to come through as university students, following young South 
Asians along trails that they seem to have blazed a decade or so ago. These new multicultural 
realities are not only making themselves felt at primary or secondary school level, therefore, 
they now affect life and work also in universities, where a new generation of the descendants 
of immigrants are coming up as top students, asking many questions that we never heard 
before. 
My observation as a researcher and an academic teacher of such new students is that 
Britain and other countries experiencing such shifts and changes are not sufficiently well 
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prepared for the resulting challenges. Europe and North America have been overrun and 
caught out. It is too late now to close borders and to talk tough, since the leaking tap of 
immigration can never be closed.5 But what one reads in the papers, also in Japan, reflects an 
impression of a movement to the right, with anti-immigration rhetoric that seems outrightly 
hostile to foreigners of any description. There is often fear of the unknown here, where 
ignorance could so easily be replaced by competent knowledge.  
But we are not yet aware enough that the subjects studied at universities of foreign studies, 
whether in Japan or elsewhere, are the new key areas of knowledge for the global future. It is 
not enough to learn English, and certainly not sufficient to learn Japanese to perfection to 
function as a global citizen. For lawyers, as I have begun to argue more forcefully recently, it 
is not enough to study ‘mainstream’ law to understand how the world functions, it is 
necessary to be exposed to issues of legal pluralism and multicultural diversity and hybridity 
(Menski 2000). 
This point links into globalisation debates, of course. In my view and experience, the 
alleged processes of international harmonization and globalization are only one side or aspect 
of actual developments. The other, equally important process of globalisation turns out to 
have a pluralising effect, as countries and people wanting to do international business on 
equal terms – rather than just engaging in some neo-colonial globalisation process - need to 
know quite in detail about the various cultures, religions and socio-philosophical systems of 
different countries in the world. 6  To that extent, the presence of migrants and their 
descendants in Europe and North America reminds us in yet another way of the presence, in 
the world as a whole, of more than just eurocentric assumptions and perceptions. But, I am 
afraid, the existing literature and academic structures are still far too eurocentric, also in 
Japan and elsewhere in East Asia. 
 
II 
The thin boundary between uniform law and personal laws 
 
To illustrate the extent of the new difficulties faced in Britain, I discuss here a legal example, 
a recent litigation involving Bangladeshi Muslims before an English court. This case could 
well be the basis of a paper in its own right. It illustrates, in the field of law and multicultural 
policy, how very thin the boundary has now become between insisting on British uniformity 
                                                 
5 The former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has recently warned that despite economic and humanitarian 
compulsions, increasing numbers of foreigners in Germany might well represent an overload. 
6 A new study from Finland strongly emphasises this particular point. See Forsander 2002. 
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and pushing for multicultural recognition. The unreported case of Ali v. Ali of 2000,7 ‘the 
case of the missing one pound’, as one may call it, encapsulates the dilemma of the British 
judiciary in new multicultural Britain.8 
The factual background to this litigation is that Mr. and Mrs. Ali, Bangladeshis settled in 
the UK, were both earning good salaries and could be described as successful young Asian 
professional individuals living in London. Since marriage is, especially for Muslims, an 
almost compulsory part of life, both parties (and more so their families, we must presume) 
began to look for suitable marriage partners. Mr. and Mrs. Ali seemed to match in terms of 
language and culture, social status and professional achievements, and marriage negotiations 
began to take a more serious form. It appears that Mrs. Ali’s mother wanted a dower or mahr 
of £50,000 for her daughter, but Mr. Ali was initially only willing to offer £5,000.9 This 
bargaining was not over some kind of sale of the woman, but reflects a contest over the 
relative status and financial standing in society of all participants to these negotiations.10 
Compared to traditional Bangladesh, the only major difference in this scenario is that the 
bargaining is over pounds or dollars now, rather than takas, and that there is a significant 
inflationary effect in Bangladesh itself, since the many Bangladeshi overseas migrants have 
driven upwards all rates of everything to do with marriage. 
The main point of the Muslim mahr clearly is to provide the wife some financial security 
after divorce or the husband’s death. In the classical Muslim law, there is an understanding 
that mahr should be divided into ‘prompt’ and ‘deferred’ dower, the first to be paid in 
connection with the consummation of the marriage, the deferred part being normally due on 
                                                 
7 Such cases, albeit important for legal practice, remain systematically unreported, which looks like a strategy to 
decrease the visibility of such issues and to delay multicultural legal recognition processes. For some earlier 
cases, many of which were never reported, see Pearl (1986). 
8 In the discussion, I was asked to elaborate on the extent of willingness of the British judiciary as an institution 
to take account of multicultural pluralities. One can point to some efforts to familiarise the judges with ‘ethnic 
minority’ facts, figures and concepts, but these appear to be still quite limited token gestures, despite the efforts 
of the Equal Treatment Bench Book (London: Judicial Studies Board 1999). Judges as highly educated 
individuals clearly resent being told what to think. Some damage was done by earlier insufficient attempts to 
impose race-focused political correctness through judicial training seminars. 
9 The Muslim dower (variously spelt as mahr, mehr or mahar) is promised or given by the husband to the wife 
and could serve her as security against simply being divorced and left without means to maintain herself. 
However, many Muslim women are not in a position to negotiate a sufficiently high mahr to derive any benefit 
from this institution. It should not be confused with ‘dowry’, which is not just a Hindu practice, but is also 
known among Muslims and in other cultures. It involves, in the extreme, direct payments from the wife’s family 
to the groom and his family. 
10 The relevant South Asian term here is izzat, esteem and prestige in society. 
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divorce or death (for details see Pearl and Menski 1998). In either case, this is an important 
financial security for the wife. 
Mr. Ali eventually agreed to promise his future wife £30,001 as mahr, and this was duly 
entered in the marriage contract or kabhinama between the parties, who had an English 
registered wedding in London as well as a traditional Muslim marriage. The couple therefore 
followed the pattern of what I have described as angrezi shariat, British Muslim law, where 
the couple make sure that they follow English law as well as the customary norms of their 
respective Muslim societies (Menski 2001). 
But this was a short-lived marriage, for many reasons. After a few months, Mr. Ali threw 
his wife out after a fight one night and soon went to court, seeking to terminate the marriage 
under English law as well. He was clearly in a rush to get rid of his wife. Mrs. Ali 
cross-petitioned the English court not to allow her husband to divorce her unless he had paid 
her any due financial entitlements, in particular the £30,001 of dower money. Under English 
law, I should explain, a professional woman in a short childless marriage would not even get 
£1 from the husband and would be expected to work, earn her own money, and rebuild her 
life. But not so under Muslim law, where men and women are not equal. The Muslim mahr is 
promised or given to the wife by the husband, as an integral part of the marriage contract, 
thus putting her in a potentially advantageous position if at the time of the marriage she (or 
someone else on her behalf) was strong enough to stand up for her rights and stipulated a 
high mahr. 
 In the High Court in London, the husband’s defense was that the wife’s claim was 
unreasonable and should be thrown out. First of all, Mr. Ali denied that he had already given 
his wife a talaq, a Muslim divorce. But whatever he claimed, his action in approaching the 
English court for a divorce clearly amounted to divorce, and thus triggered off the wife’s 
claim for her mahr. However hard the husband tried, he could not claim that his wife was 
divorcing him, which would have meant that she would have lost her claim to the dower.  
Mr. Ali’s refusal to acknowledge his obligations under Muslim law pleased some English 
lawyers, who still expect that Asians and others will assimilate over time. Mr. Ali argued in 
essence that in England, only English law should be applied, and hence he urged the judge to 
ignore the wife’s pleas for mahr because it involved Muslim law, which was only a matter of 
culture, but not of law. But what is law? One could start another lecture on this point alone, 
which would show that the multicultural scenario and experience of countries like Britain is 
making an immensely rich contribution to our postmodern understanding of what law is and 
cannot be (Menski 2000). 
 In Ali v. Ali, I was acting as an expert on Muslim law and explained to the learned judge 
that there were two marriages, a Muslim nikah and an English registered marriage, and there 
were also two divorces, the Muslim talaq and the ongoing English divorce proceedings. I 
stressed that, as a consequence, there were also two sets of financial arrangements that would 
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need to be considered. While it was evident that under English law the wife would not be 
entitled to significant financial relief, under Muslim law there was a contract to the effect that 
the husband would pay the wife £30,001 in the event of divorce. 
 Rather feebly, the husband tried to argue that such a high amount of mahr was forced upon 
him. A Muslim husband in this situation would naturally be quite reluctant to admit that he 
had been forced to agree to the demands of the wife’s side. This would not be good for izzat. 
Mr. Ali elegantly explained this problem as a matter of social ranking, arguing that such high 
amounts of dower are publicly promised for the sake of status in society, with no intention 
that this kind of money should actually ever be paid.  
Not surprisingly, the judge was a little confused. I insisted that if he did not consider the 
complete multicultural scenario, he would not only be doing injustice to the wife, but he 
would also damage the standing of English law, because he would drive Mrs. Ali straight into 
the office of one of Britain’s many Shariat Councils, virtual Muslim courts, which have an 
unofficial internal hierarchy. This clearly worried the learned judge, and the next day he gave 
Mrs. Ali the decision she wanted, holding that she was entitled to £30,000. But there is one 
pound missing! Why is that, and what is it that we learn from this case about the general 
position in Britain today on immigration and multiculturalism? 
 The learned judge had clearly understood that he could not ignore Muslim law in this 
dispute. As an English judge working in the High Court at London, however, he could not 
just apply English law, because that would seriously disadvantage the Muslim wife and 
would mean a further contested matter before some sort of Muslim judicial forum. That had 
to be avoided as a matter of legal policy, which raises the question whether the judge was 
really helping the woman, or was he only protecting the state and supporting its claims to 
exclusive legal authority, in the sense that only state law is law? 
Any decent book on jurisprudence tells us that law is much more than just state law. Here 
we are dealing with Muslim law, which vigorously claims to be dominant over various forms 
of state law. But while recourse to Muslim dispute settlement fora could not be encouraged 
by the English judge, it also had to be avoided that an English judge just applies Muslim law 
as part of the law of the land. That would clearly go too far in terms of the adaptation of 
English law to the presence of well over one million (and perhaps almost two million) 
Muslims. Thus, the multicultural contest has come as close as that now: One little step further, 
and we have in Britain what modernists are so desperately arguing against, namely a legal 
system based on concurrent personal laws allocated on the basis of religion, as found almost 
everywhere in Asia and Africa, and certainly not just among Muslims. 
But if English law were to take account of Muslim law in this way, it would have to 
recognise other legal systems and personal laws as well. Indeed, there are many signs that 
this process is already fully under way. For example, in Chief Adjudication Officer v. Bath, 
2000 [1] Family Law Reports, at page 8, the Court of Appeal recognised the claim of a Sikh 
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widow that she was entitled to a widow’s pension, even though she had only been married in 
a London Sikh temple (gurudwara) 35 years earlier and had never registered her marriage 
under English law while her husband was alive. 
So what precisely happened in Ali v. Ali, why is there a pound missing? The English judge, 
faced with this multicultural scenario, clearly refused to implement the detail of the Muslim 
contract of marriage and its consequences, otherwise he would have awarded Mrs. Ali 
£30,001. By giving her £1 less, he applied not Muslim law, but asserted the application of 
English law, through the English law on equity, with its strong notions of justice and fairness. 
Thus, he not only helped the woman, but also protected English law from the unrelenting 
pressure to accept personal laws, such as that of the Muslims, as part of the new British legal 
framework. The missing £1 is a powerful indicator of how close the contest has become, and 
how well aware of this problem the English judges now are. 
Among these judges there are, as yet, very few lawyers from ethnic minorities, but around 
15% of newly qualifying lawyers in Britain in the past few years have been members of 
ethnic minorities, more than twice the percentage of their share in the population. Of course, 
not all of those proceed to practice law in the UK, but in times to come, and sooner rather 
than later, we will have many senior non-white English lawyers who are not English and I am 
happy to see some former students among them. Such pressures in various professional fields 
are now felt all over Europe and North America. For example one could check the name lists 
of those who pass the professional accountancy exams in Britain, and the picture is 
remarkably similar. But instead of trying to understand all dimensions of these new processes, 
our common reaction has been to continue to argue over ‘immigrant disadvantage’ and, at the 
same time, to barely disguise our jealousy of the new top layer of brown and black students 
and professionals. 
Of course all of this is not restricted to the UK. Edwards (2002) reports on a recent case 
from New Jersey in which, allegedly for the first time, a US court held in the case of Odatalla 
v. Odatalla (FM-000366-01) that an agreement for an Islamic dower of one golden pound 
coin and $10,000 was acceptable under American law under “neutral principles of law”. This 
phraseology is just another attempt to circumscribe notions of justice and fairness, without 
applying Muslim law directly in a supposedly secular jurisdiction like the USA. The New 
Jersey judge accepted that here was a contractual agreement between two consenting adults, 
and thus gave Mrs. Odatalla the precise amount that was involved in the Muslim contract, in 
a way that the English judge in Ali v. Ali was not quite willing to do. It appears that US courts 
have much experience of such matters, but there is no clear policy emerging as yet, like in 
Britain and other countries. Edwards (2002) reports that New York and Florida have accepted 
mahr arrangements as pre-nuptial agreements, while California has struck them down as 
being against public policy. So, in the USA, too, a discussion is now under way about the 
changing relationship between the national courts and an increasingly multicultural and plural 
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society. 
 
III 
The new British scenario and its implications 
 
Such legal actions and their fallout in socio-economic terms illustrate the new developments 
experienced by countries like Britain in the fields of immigration and multiculturalism. The 
classic early studies on immigration and race relations in the UK all treated the newcomers as 
deprived, destatussed and mainly ‘black’ individuals from former colonies who would suffer 
multiple disadvantages in their new environment for some time to come. The mere 
assumption that ‘they’ as newly arrived immigrants were low-status, low-class people has, 
however, only partly proved right. We recognise today that many of the migrants have not 
come from depressed backgrounds, but from enterprising middle class environments, which 
see migration of some of their members as a promising and viable strategy for the family as a 
whole to improve their status in society. Especially through remittances of foreign exchange, 
the family’s financial standing in every respect would eventually improve, but first certain 
individuals would have to go abroad and work for the whole family. Contrary to popular 
assumptions, not all men sent abroad in such scenarios of family planning are totally keen 
migrants, many voice their resentment, as one can test through fieldwork anywhere. I recently 
interviewed some restaurant workers and cooks in Indian and Pakistani restaurants in Japan. 
One man told me that he has to feed 21 people in India, and he cannot even take a holiday, 
because it would mean missing out on pay. He would dearly love to have another family 
member working abroad to share the burden, but immigration restrictions make this 
increasingly difficult, and the initial investments are escalating. Many migrants today, also 
among asylum seekers, are therefore representatives of families that have planned the 
planting of a family member abroad. They may have invested much money in this, 
anticipating that this man will earn money and status for the whole clan. In certain 
communities, this might also involve women as pioneers, in Britain earlier many West Indian 
female migrants, Goan housekeepers during the 1990s, nurses from Kerala in Germany and 
elsewhere, and many Filipino nurses, who were recruited in significant numbers to Britain 
during the 1970s. Significantly, some of their children and grandchildren now study law and 
other professional subjects at London University and elsewhere. 
 Such evidence of rapid social mobility has not been picked up by mainly white researchers 
who continue to have blinkers about ‘immigrant disadvantage’. Sure, there are some poor and 
deprived Asian migrants and their descendants in the UK, but we are easily blinded by 
outward impressions that feed negative stereotypes. Already during the mid-1980s, when a 
team of Japanese researchers visited the UK for extended research on South Asian migrants 
(Koga, Naito and Hamaguchi 2000), they found that among the richest people in Britain were 
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a number of Asian business families, and the figures have since gone up tremendously. These 
were not only formerly successful East African businessmen from Kenya or Uganda (in 
summer 2002 it is thirty years since the Ugandan Asian exodus was caused by Idi Amin), but 
also newcomers from India and other places. 
Real, statistically measurable success can be followed up only in those families that have 
substantial assets in the UK itself, and have to declare them in terms of tax and company 
regulations. There are many more individuals, though, who silently slave away for their 
families overseas, and send a large share of their earnings back there, so that they may indeed 
be fairly poor themselves in the UK, living in cheap old houses in deprived areas. But while 
the image of immigrant poverty is thus entrenched for some observers who only study the 
surface, the impact of overseas migration manifests itself in many parts of South Asia. 
Examples would be extravagant houses built by Gulf workers and others in Kerala, 
businesses in Jullundur, the Sylheti prosperity as a result of many Bangladeshis having 
moved to the UK and the Gulf, and investments made by Mirpuri Kashmiris in Pakistan and 
Azad Kashmir. The agenda of immigrant disadvantage are by no means irrelevant today, but 
there is much more to say about migrants as members of hugely complex transnational and 
‘translocal’ (as Roger Ballard now sees this) networks. 
It is not possible in this brief article to go into details of where, when and how various 
groups of migrants came to the UK. It is evident from recent anthropological research (Shaw 
2000) that the migration histories of certain communities, clans and families constitute a most 
interesting area of research (see now Visram 2002). But this kind of research work requires 
enormous sensitivity and a lot of painstaking detailed effort, which many researchers are 
simply not willing to put in. It is only since the 1990s that some studies teach us in more 
detail about the realities of immigration, ‘race relations’ and multiculturalism from a more 
specifically internal perspective. 
A key text in this respect, which has also influenced my own thinking about legal processes, 
which it precisely mirrors, is Roger Ballard’s (1994) book on Desh pardesh, the image of a 
new home abroad. Ballard observes that far from assimilating in the UK to the English 
mainstream, many Asians view themselves and their indigenous cultures (whatever that 
precisely means in individual cases) as superior. Consequently, they not only refuse to 
assimilate, but despise the ‘dirty whites’ just as fervently as some of the English detest the 
‘Pakis’, which is still a collective term of abuse for all Asians. But Pakistan, Panjab and 
Gujarat have now come to Bradford, Birmingham, Leicester and many other places in the UK. 
Ballard shows how comprehensively the new socio-cultural reconstruction processes have 
been. He illustrates that Asians have reconfigurated the British environment “on their own 
terms” (Ballard 1994: 8), and have not, as expected by the dominant establishment, 
abandoned their own cultures. Thus, the old model of second generation youngsters being 
lost “between two cultures’ (Watson 1977) has been replaced and largely superseded by 
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Ballard’s image of the ‘skilled cultural navigator’. This is a person who switches 
mid-sentence from English to Hindi, Urdu or Gujarati, and now to Somali and many other 
languages, and can also handle a wide variety of socio-cultural situations within a personally 
selected, more or less broad band.11 So a British Muslim may go to a pub with his or her 
colleagues, but will probably drink orange juice instead of beer. 
More recently, Ballard’s main concern has been with informal translocal networks among 
South Asian migrants in the UK, which he sees as local subversive networks, built up from 
below, linking people on account of chain migration, family relationship or local residence. 
Such ties of loyalty allow, for example, a working-class family to buy a large house, often 
without a mortgage from the bank. Ballard’s as yet unpublished work shows that these 
informal networks of loyalty are extremely powerful and resourceful; one crucial point is that 
they bypass and undermine the official channels. So, if Asians found it difficult earlier to 
obtain loans from banks, as we know, they learnt again to pool resources and built up their 
shops and factories nevertheless. If Muslims were told not to use loans from banks to avoid 
the tainted interest arrangements of riba, similarly resourceful poolings or other forms of 
profit-sharing were created to get around such prohibitions. 
Such multiple strategies of self-help and loyalty within the community have created barely 
hidden resentment. Ballard’s research confirms that such British Asian methods of using 
localized yet potentially international loyalty patterns are now subtly being criminalized as 
illegal and devious, because they do not follow formal and normal norms. It seems to be the 
English standard norm that if you want to buy a house in Britain, you ask for a mortgage. If 
somehow certain people who do not appear to be wealthy do not need a mortgage, there must 
be something wrong with their tax declaration, or they have a very clever accountant, or 
something dodgy is going on. It is a strange coincidence that while Ballard was working on 
such observations, I wrote an article on ‘Chameleons and dodgy lawyers’ (Menski 2002), 
which makes the very same point about the hazards of Asian assimilation: Even if you try and 
assimilate as much as you can, and desperately make your color blend in with that of the 
wider environment, you will still be identified in some form as ‘the other’ and will be taken 
to task for doing things differently than is ‘the norm’. Even the most successful ethnic 
minority professionals are not trusted, and they are treated with a certain degree of jealousy, 
since they have access to formal and informal ‘ethnic’ networks that a ‘white’ English person 
will be unlikely ever to penetrate. This, indeed, applies also to lawyers, so that knowledge of 
                                                 
11 In the discussion, it was rightly pointed out that not all Asian young people are able to become Ballard’s 
‘skilled cultural navigators’. Indeed, many young British Asians struggle to make sense of their hybrid lives, 
and more are now found among Britain’s growing jail population. However, the critical point made by Ballard 
is that the average English pupil or student is not helped by the education system to become anything close to a 
competent multicultural ‘skilled cultural navigator’. 
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foreign law may actually taint practitioners, and makes them appear ‘dodgy’ in the eyes of the 
majority because they are able to take recourse to methods, networks, and thus resources, to 
which the ‘white’ mainstream has no access. In other words, the ability to operate 
professionally as a skilled cultural navigator becomes even more resented, and leads to 
unacknowledged inferiority complexes among those who belong to the majority because ‘the 
others’ are manifestly doing so well. 
The highly effective self-organization of ethnic minorities, in response to systematic 
exclusion and discrimination, has by now generated a higher level of fear and growing 
insecurity in Britain, rather than increasing motivation to understand how these multicultural 
processes function and can be used for the benefit of all. One can see several prominent 
examples. The Hinduja brothers as multi-million leading entrepreneurs were earlier feted by 
Tony Blair and his followers as models of enterprise culture and Britain’s success in 
assimilating newcomers. But when the Hindujas made some noises about Hindu culture and 
its relevance in Britain today, and started to fund research on Vedic Hinduism, they were 
denounced as traitors and have since been virtually treated as criminals. The same has 
happened to Keith Vaz, the first Asian MP to become a junior minister. When he started 
speaking up on specific Asian issues, he was slapped down very fast and lost his ministerial 
position.12 More recently, David Lammy, a former student of mine and one of the few British 
black MPs, who is still below 30, has become a junior minister, but he keeps fairly quiet so 
far and is even a little coy about his law degree from the School of Oriental and African 
Studies, listing himself as an inconspicuous graduate of London University instead. 
 What does this show? Members of an ‘ethnic minority’ in Britain today who emphasize 
that fact too visibly, are going to face difficulties, because the pressures of assimilation 
remain so very strong. At the same time, making oneself invisible is not really a viable option 
for non-white migrants and their descendants. The problem lies elsewhere. While the 
well-educated ethnic minority student might speak several languages and may be at home in a 
variety of cultural contexts – precisely Ballard’s ‘skilled cultural navigator’ – the real 
problem for British society is identified by Ballard and others in that the majority population 
remains mono-cultural and resists pluralization because it cannot handle it competently. How 
many English people study Hindi or Urdu? But all Asians are expected to be fluent in English 
- and probably only they can become skilled cultural navigators in specific combinations. 
Ethnic minority status thus involves not systematic disadvantage, but a structural 
advantage, because it enforces pluralization, ultimately for the benefit of the individuals 
concerned. That kind of pressure does not exist for ‘normal’ English kids, just as most 
Japanese students do not perceive the need to work extra hard to cope in a global 
environment. The underlying intellectual problem in the UK and elsewhere, namely that the 
                                                 
12 There may well be other reasons of a ‘dodgy’ nature in this case, but I have no access to the relevant details. 
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concept of ‘ethnicity’ has still not been understood in its proper perspective as it applies in the 
new multicultural scenarios, is clearly not admitted. Roger Ballard has been facing immense 
difficulties in seeing his work accepted for publication, and his seminal findings are clearly 
not taken seriously enough in policy making circles. 
The same fate has befallen Professor Bhikhu Parekh, whose detailed Report on Britain’s 
multicultural developments and future (Parekh 2000) has been unceremoniously swept under 
the carpet. The Parekh Report is a document prepared under the chairmanship of (now Lord) 
Bhikhu Parekh, a retired Professor of Political Science (University of Hull). This Report is 
not only Parekh’s work, it is based on intensive discussions with many concerned people, 
almost from all walks of life. But all the blame has been thrown on Parekh as “the most 
dangerous academic in Britain” (Times of India, 26th August 2001). The Parekh Report was 
swiftly condemned and vilified by the British press. While it asks in much detail for many 
constructive changes, its numerous recommendations in relation to virtually all fields of life 
are being ignored, as though the Report was never written. What went wrong? The key phrase 
that led to this remarkable hostility is apparently the sentence on Britishness as a matter of 
racial identity (Parekh 2000: 38): 
 
Britishness, as much as Englishness, has systematic, largely unspoken, racial 
connotations. Whiteness nowhere features as an explicit condition of being British, but it 
is widely understood that Englishness, and therefore by extension Britishness, is racially 
coded. ‘There ain’t no black in the Union Jack’, it has been said. 
 
What Parekh meant and wrote was that the term ‘British’ has racial connotations, in that a 
British person is still widely presumed to be white, while the multi-ethnic reality of Britain 
today means that many British people are not white. What the press made of this is clearly 
quite different, alleging that Parekh had said and written that the use of the term ‘British’ was 
racist. Hence, the key term of British identity was felt to be under threat, and defensive 
mechanisms went into operation. I have not followed up all aspects of the debate about this, 
but there was in fact very little debate, simply an angry act of denial that what the report has 
to say is relevant to Britain’s multicultural future. 
Actually, Parekh said nothing new. Roger Ballard has long been arguing, well before his 
1994 study on Desh pardesh, that South Asian youngsters are engaged in reconstructing their 
own British South Asian worlds, speak ‘chutney Hindustani’ one moment, and broad 
Cockney or Yorkshire dialect the next, or maybe even Oxford English, if it fits the scene. As 
indicated, Ballard’s long-term anthropological observations have been matched by my own 
findings about legal adjustment processes, so that we have today not only British Muslim law 
(angrezi shariat), but also a postmodern form of British Hindu law (angrezi dharma) and lots 
of other angrezi hybrids. For example, among Somalis in Britain one can now find the same 
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plural socio-cultural phenomena in their early stages. 
But these are efforts made by the ethnic minorities themselves to make sense of their 
hybrid existences in new multicultural environments. Despite some liberal-sounding rhetoric, 
the UK refuses to accept that everybody is ‘ethnic’, and that New Britain is a place in which 
multicultural strategies and methods will need to be rethought.13 Earlier, many ‘white’ people 
left the UK, or moved to ‘unspoilt’ rural areas, but where will they go now? In Britain today, 
almost every village shop and post office in ‘white’ areas is now run by Asians, like the East 
African duka network of small shops across the country. More and more Asian firms are 
becoming the employers of non-Asians, and for many people in Europe, the limits have been 
reached and the mood towards immigrants and immigration turns hostile. 
 However, these ‘immigrants’ are no longer migrants, they are now supposedly equal 
citizens of the UK, born there, educated in British schools and at home, and they are often 
immensely competitive. I see more and more such people in my classes. In every field of life, 
there is a growing feeling of competition from ‘them’. Even English people who claim to 
have no racist inclinations at all say to me that they feel threatened now, as their 
neighborhoods are being taken over, mosques and temples come up everywhere, and even the 
physical landscape of Britain becomes more multicultural, with smells, sounds and sights that 
make you think this is not the Britain it used to be. But instead of constructively debating 
how the new multicultural realities may be turned into a harmonious future, Britain hides 
behind assimilationist presumptions that are not borne out anywhere, now not even in the law 
courts. There is a lot of work to be done in every area that the Parekh Report identified. 
 
IV 
The renewed diversionary focus on immigration law 
 
Instead, in this climate of total insecurity about immigrants and the long-term consequences 
of their presence, the focus has now once again shifted towards the rhetoric of immigration 
control. But immigration to the UK and many other countries in Europe is no longer just 
about economics, in terms of labor migration for certain industries who need more willing 
hands. Immigration now often involves family relationships, so that the image of the 1960s, 
of a largely male-dominated so-called ‘primary’ labor migration has long been replaced by 
various forms of ‘secondary’ migration, in which someone applies to come to the UK on the 
basis of a family link with an existing migrant. The inevitable result is more pressure of 
                                                 
13  I observed in Japan a similar need for rethinking the ‘ethnic’ label, in particular. It appears that other Asians 
are labeled as ‘ethnic’, but not the Japanese themselves, nor Italians or Germans. 
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numbers.14 Once the process of family reunification had been more or less completed, a new 
process began, which continues to puzzle observers, and has been leading to some rather 
dishonest current discourse about specifically Asian problems like ‘forced marriages’. The 
real underlying issue is the annoyance among government officials that Asians in Britain 
continue to make a large number of international marriage arrangements, which involve the 
migration of one spouse, either man or woman, to the UK. 
 This is the new form of family formation, where a young couple settles down in the UK, 
which is often the place where the bride grew up, while the man is from South Asia or 
elsewhere.15 Is this not a violation of traditional customs? Whatever the answer, the overall 
net effect is more Asian migration, more growth of Asian settlement centers, more brown 
young British people in schools all over the country. Already well over a third of all new 
births in some British cities are Asian babies, and Birmingham and Leicester seem to be in 
competition over the title of first European city with a non-white majority. 
 This kind of family migration, combined with significant demographic trends in Britain 
itself, where mixed-descent children form a rapidly growing section that is not just ‘white’, 
cannot really be stopped. Imposing strict immigration controls automatically infringes 
people’s basic human rights and there is no easy solution to such problems. The British 
government, through its present Home Secretary David Blunkett, gives quite conflicting 
signals and pretends to be in charge. On the one hand, Blunkett claims that Asians are 
devious criminals who need to be prevented from coming to Europe as asylum seekers and as 
partners in ‘forced marriages’, while on the other hand he makes loud noises about the need 
for more professional staff from overseas to retain the competitiveness of the British economy. 
But can Blunkett have his cake and eat it, too? I do not think so, and predict that, whatever 
the government officially says, immigration of non-white people to Britain will continue, and 
Britain will eventually have to accept that Asians and others are not only part of the New 
Britain, but lay rightful claims to many prominent positions and entitlements. 
In this context, a few words about asylum must suffice. Japan, too, has recently felt the 
impact of the international debate on refugees and asylum. Claiming asylum has indeed 
become one of the few avenues open to people who are not able to come to Europe or North 
America otherwise – but at a price. There are clearly many strong links with illegal 
                                                 
14 In a much-noted article in the Japan Times of 8th February 2002 (‘Immigration changing the West’), William 
Pfaff commented that “[s]heer numbers have decided the matter”, but took in my view a too negative overall 
view of the potential for multicultural education. 
15 There is also a significant out-migration of British Asians and others as a result of international marriage 
arrangements, but this is never publicly noted, maintaining the impression that Asians only move into Britain 
and never leave. It is evident today that in the international status hierarchy of preferred destinations for 
marrying couples, Britain is only somewhere in the middle of the rankings. 
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arrangements made by travel agents and other ‘helpers’, thus asylum has become a huge 
business, a fact that evidently disturbs asylum lawyers, who also see many really genuine 
cases of seeking protection from persecution. 
To combat manifest abuses, the British Home Secretary has pushed for Europe-wide 
restrictions and has begun to announce changes to the immigration regime, in terms of 
allowing more migrants into the country under certain categories, and clamping down on 
illegal migrants, overstayers and ‘bogus’ asylum seekers. But all of this seems deeply 
dishonest. Not only in Japan, the issue of foreign students working rather than studying is an 
old hat. This has again become an issue in the UK now, where overseas students have long 
been allowed to work part-time. However, top overseas students may now secure places at 
top British universities, graduate as top students - and immediately have a well-paid job in 
London or New York, as though all these immigration restrictions for foreign citizens did not 
exist. This flexible handling of immigration regulations and work permit regimes facilitates 
international career planning among elite populations and shows that the UK is only too well 
aware of international competitiveness - and wants its slice of the professional elite. At the 
same time, Britain also allows thousands of people into the country as asylum seekers or in 
various other capacities, because we need such people to clean our offices, make our tea, run 
the restaurants, and do all the jobs that the established residents, including the new 
professional Asians, would never want to do any more. You still see Panjabi grandmothers, 
often still original migrants, sweep the floors at Heathrow Airport, but their grandchildren are 
studying hard to become professionals. The young people serving coffee in the airport 
lounges are now mainly Somalis and other Africans and no longer predominantly Panjabis, or 
they come from Eastern Europe. The scenario is changing faster than most researchers 
realise. 
 
V 
The pluralization of New Britain 
 
Britain clearly benefits from the considerable energies generated by its resident ethnic 
minority populations and from the contributions by successive waves of more recent 
newcomers from all over the world. But the price Britain is going to pay for poaching 
professionals and others from all over the world, as the USA is also discovering in the long 
run, is an increasing pluralization of New Britain, rather than the assimilation process that 
was expected in the 1970s and even into the 1990s. Everywhere, the Christian bias of 
so-called secular legal systems is now coming under challenge, a new area of research of 
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immense importance.16 
Some writers have suggested that the European connections in terms of human rights law 
and jurisprudence within the European Union are becoming more important and will help 
towards integration of migrants. These are typical pious hopes without much basis in facts, 
despite the odd good news. I have studied and taught this difficult area for some time, only to 
leave the field in some disappointment, as it appears that these European mechanisms offer 
no meaningful protection to Asians and Africans in Europe. For example under Article 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to family life is guaranteed, but not the 
right to family life in a country of your choice. It is still the nation state that has the last word 
over whether one can settle with one’s spouse in London or Bradford. I know rather too many 
cases where families have been split up by English law on strange, formal grounds. Nobody 
seems to care about this kind of human suffering caused by the application of the supposedly 
human rights centered state law.  
It is this systematic violation of non-white people’s basic rights and clear evidence of 
various forms of unredressed and systematic discrimination which reinforce the message for 
Asians and other ‘ethnic minorities’ in the UK that it is not even desirable to become one of 
‘them’, and much safer to retain the links and protection with one’s traditional regional and 
local cultures from overseas and in diaspora. One well-educated British Pakistani woman, 
whose husband was not allowed to join her in the UK for several years after their marriage in 
Pakistan, expressed her bewilderment very clearly: What else could she have done, as a loyal 
British subject? It appeared to her that the British state was letting her down, just because she 
was an Asian woman – and got away with this. A deep sense of systematic injustice is felt by 
many Asians and Africans in the UK. This is not conducive to multicultural harmony and 
does not match the official agenda of assimilation. 
New Britain will need to remain engaged with questions of immigration and 
multiculturalism, and one can only hope that some progress will be made in this field, since 
the present situation remains disturbingly dominated by official discrimination, even within 
the anti-discrimination law itself (Jones and Welhengama 2000). The approaches to 
immigration and especially to multiculturalism remain deeply unsatisfactory due to the 
                                                 
16 The Salman Rushdie affair is still fresh in the minds of British Muslims, who found on that occasion that their 
religion is not protected by English law against blasphemy, since only Anglican Christianity enjoys such 
protection. In the USA, a recent court decision of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that it was 
unconstitutional to ask schoolchildren to recite the Pledge of Allegiance vowing fealty to one nation ‘under 
God’, leading to protests from, inter alia, President Bush (The Daily Yomiuri, 28th June 2002). A new study of 
the place of religion in Indian law (Larson 2001) suggests that the integrated multi-religious ‘secular’ model of 
India, rather than the artificial division of law and religion in Western secular thinking, may be a more 
appropriate global multicultural model than the USA. 
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dominance of modernist and eurocentric assumptions about the innate superiority of 
everything that is modern and Euro-American. 17  This field of research has grown in 
complexity and the subject matter it involves is not as simple as might once have seemed. We 
need many new researchers to assist governments and people to unravel the resulting knots 
and to work towards a more harmonious, plurality-focused future. However, this challenge is 
not only posed to New Britain, it is a global issue of increasing relevance that requires more 
academic attention and more honest policy making.  
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